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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
T h ei m p l i c a t i o n so fa d o p t i n ga ne x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ec o n s t i t u t eal o n gs t a n d i n g
debate in economics. Many theoretical and empirical papers have discussed the
consequences of adopting a speciﬁc regime.
Friedman [15] strongly advocated the adoption of a ﬂoating regime. Many
years later, economists still debate the advantages and disadvantages of ex-
change rate regimes. Relatively recent papers with a theoretical ﬂavor on the
subject are Calvo [8], Edwards and Levy-Yeyati [13], Fischer [14], Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ [25], and Sopraseuth [29].
The empirical regularities associated with each type of exchange rate regime
are also the focus of a large body of literature. Baxter and Stockman [7],
Husain, Moody and Rogoﬀ [16] and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [20] are good
examples of this line of investigation.
∗The author acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the Brazilian Council of Science and
Technology (CNPq).
†E-mail: abcunha@ibmecrj.br. Web site: http://professores.ibmecrj.br/abcunha.
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There are also many papers focused on classifying a country’s exchange rate
policy. Calvo and Reinhart [9], Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [21] and Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ [27] are typical examples of this literature.
In this paper we study whether adopting a ﬂoating exchange rate regime
has clear-cut implications for equilibrium prices and allocations. We adopt a
small open-economy deterministic version of the cash-credit model of Lucas and
Stokey [22]. There exists a single consumption good. Consumers face a cash-in-
advance constraint on a fraction of their purchases of that good. Labor is the
only input. There is free ﬁnancial capital mobility. Government consumption
and tax rates on labor income are exogenous.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom on exchange rate regimes, we show that
competitive equilibrium prices and allocations are consistent with any path for
the government’s foreign assets. In this sense, it is not relevant whether the
exchange rate ﬂoats or not.
A simple way to provide intuition for the result mentioned in the last para-
graph is to relate our ﬁnding to Modigliani and Miller [23]. These authors
showed that in a competitive environment, it is irrelevant whether a ﬁrm ﬁ-
nances its investment projects with equity or debt. Similarly, it is irrelevant
whether a government meets its ﬁnancing needs by issuing domestic bonds or
reducing its foreign assets. In other words, a competitive equilibrium pins down
only the total government debt and not its composition.
Several macroeconomic papers have derived some type of indeterminacy.
Barro [3] is a well-known one. Recently, Bassetto and Kocherlakota [6] managed
to extend Barro’s ﬁnding to a model with distorting taxes. Wallace [30] obtained
a Modigliani-Miller result for open-market operations. The indeterminacy result
we present is in line of the ﬁndings of these authors.
The indeterminacy of a government’s debt composition in a competitive
equilibrium suggests that the theoretical study of exchange rate regimes requires
a departure from the competitive framework. Therefore, we study the problem
of selecting an optimal monetary policy in the same small open-economy model
in which we derived that indeterminacy. Following Chari and Kehoe [10], we
assume that the government cannot commit to a sequence of policies and adopt
the sustainable equilibrium concept.
As Alvarez, Kehoe and Neumeyer [2], Lucas and Stokey [22] and Persson,
Persson and Svensson [26] pointed out, the composition and the maturity of
government debt matters for the time consistency of monetary policy. We build
on these authors’ works to show that the best sustainable outcomes are not
invariant to the path of government foreign assets.1 That is, the indeterminacy
present in a competitive equilibrium does not show up when a government selects
policies in a sequential way.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 studies some features of the competitive equilibrium. Section 4 discusses
the properties of optimal policies without commitment. Section 5 presents our
1As Albanesi, Chari and Christiano [1] pointed out, a game without commitment may have
many equilibria. Therefore, we focus on a best outcome.
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concluding remarks. The Appendix contains the proof of a proposition.
2 The economy
Consider a small country populated by a continuum of identical inﬁnitely lived
households with Lebesgue measure one and a government. A household is com-
posed of a shopper and a worker, who is endowed with one unit of time.
This country produces a single good. This good is consumed by households
(c) and government (g) .I tc a na l s ob ee x p o r t e d( x)o ri m p o r t e d( −x).
Transactions take place in this economy in a particular way. At a ﬁrst stage
of each date t, spot markets for goods and labor services operate. At a second
stage, security and currency markets operate.2
A domestic currency M circulates in this economy. Two types of securities
a r et r a d e d :ac l a i mB, with maturity of one period, to one unit of M and a claim
A, with the same maturity, to one unit of some foreign currency. Foreigners do
not sell or buy claims to the domestic currency. Government and residents can
purchase and/or sell the claims A∗ at a price, in terms of the foreign currency,
q∗
t.
Workers cannot sell their services outside the country. Shoppers face a cash-
in-advance constraint. A fraction of their purchases of the consumption good
must be paid for with the domestic currency. Except for these cash purchases,
all other transactions are liquidated during the securities and currency trading
session. The date t price, in terms of the foreign currency, of the tradable good
is constant and equal to 1.
Technology is described by 0 ≤ y ≤ l,w h e r ey is the output of the sole good
and l is the amount of labor allocated to its production. The good is produced
by a single competitive ﬁrm. As usual, the index t denotes time. Feasibility
requires
c1t + c2t + gt + xt = lt ,( 1 )
where c1t denotes people’s purchase of the consumption good that is paid cash
and c2t denotes their remaining purchase of the consumption good.
The government ﬁnances the sequence {gt}∞
t=0 by issuing and withdrawing
domestic currency; by issuing and redeeming claims B of maturity of one period
to one unit of the domestic currency; by purchasing and selling B∗; and by taxing
labor income at a proportional tax τ.
The sequence {gt,τt,q∗
t}∞
t=0 is exogenous. For each t, the vector (gt,τt,q∗
t)
belongs to a ﬁnite set contained in [0,1)2 × (0,1).
The government budget constraint is
Stgt + Mt + Bt + Stq∗
tAG,t+1 = τtwtlt + Mt+1 + qtBt+1 + StAG,t ,( 2 )
2We adopted the Svensson [28] timing. In this context, unexpected inﬂation does not act
as a pure lump sum tax. Therefore, the problem of selecting an optimal policy will have a well
deﬁned solution even if the government has some outstanding debt at date zero. See Nicolini
[24], especially section 3, for further details.
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where wt and qt are the respective date t monetary prices (in terms of the
domestic currency) of labor services and the domestic claim; St is the nominal
exchange rate; AG,t+1 stands for the foreign assets held by the government at
the end of date t; and Mt+1 and Bt+1 are the amounts of domestic currency
and public debt held by the households at the end of date t. A negative value
for AG,t+1 means that the government is borrowing abroad, while a negative
value for Bt+1 means that the government is lending to domestic residents. At
t =0the government holds an initial amount ¯ AG of foreign assets.
Let AH,t+1stand for the foreign assets held by the household at the end of
date t. To avoid Ponzi schemes, we impose the borrowing constraints
   
Bt+1
St+1
   ,|AH,t+1|,|AG,t+1|≤K<∞ (3)
on asset holdings. As usual, K is some real number large enough so that these
constraints never bind in a competitive equilibrium.
The function u : R2
+ × [0,1] → R ∪{ − ∞ } , u = u(c1,c 2,1 − l) is the typical
household period utility function. This function displays local non-satiability
and satisﬁes standard diﬀerentiability and Inada conditions. Intertemporal pref-
erences are described by
∞ 
t=0
β
tu(c1t,c 2t,1 − lt) ,( 4 )
where β ∈ (0,1). The date t budget constraint of the typical household is
St(c1t+c2t)+Mt+1+qtBt+1+Stq∗
tAH,t+1 ≤ (1−τt)wtlt+Mt+Bt+StAH,t ,( 5 )
where AH,t+1stands for the foreign assets held by the household at the end of
date t. People face the cash-in-advance constraint
Stc1t ≤ Mt .( 6 )
At date zero, given initial asset holdings ( ¯ M, ¯ B, ¯ AH), a household chooses
a sequence {c1t,c 2t,l t,M t+1,B t+1,A H,t+1}∞
t=0 to maximize (4) subject to the
constraints (5), (6), (3) and lt ≤ 1. Except for Bt+1 and AH,t+1, all these
variables must be non-negative. Additionally, the sequences {c1t}∞
t=0, {c2t}∞
t=0
and {Mt+1/St+1}∞
t=0 have to be bounded. At each period t, the ﬁrm chooses lt
to maximize Stlt − wtlt.
3 Competitive equilibrium
We start this section by establishing some notation. We denote a date t price
vector (St,w t,q t) by ψt and a date t bundle (c1t,c 2t,l t) by χt, while ϕt+1 stands
for people’s end of period t asset holding (Mt+1,B t+1,A Ht+1). Additionally,
(ψ,χ,ϕ)={ψt,χ t,ϕ t+1}∞
t=0.
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Deﬁnition 1 A competitive equilibrium is an object (ψ,χ,ϕ) plus sequences
{AG,t+1}∞
t=0 and {xt}∞
t=0 that satisﬁes: (i) given ψ, (χ,ϕ) provides a solution
to the typical household problem; (ii) wt = St; (iii) (1) and (2) hold. Sequences
ψ, χ, ϕ, {AG,t+1}∞
t=0 and {xt}∞
t=0 are attainable i ft h e ya r ep a r to fs o m ec o m -
petitive equilibrium.
A balance-of-payment condition was not spelled out in deﬁnition 1. It is
not necessary to do so. Observe that adding the zero-proﬁt condition wtlt =
St(c1t + c2t + gt + xt) to (2) and (5) taken as equality, one obtains
xt + AG,t + AH,t − q∗
t(AG,t+1 + AH,t+1)=0,( 7 )
which is the balance-of-payments identity of this model economy.
As usual in small open-economy models, a competitive equilibrium must
satisfy a condition that rules out arbitrage between domestic and foreign assets.
Namely, the nominal exchange rate and domestic and foreign bond prices must
satisfy the parity condition
Stq∗
t = St+1qt .( 8 )
We are now in a position to establish that the composition of the govern-
ment debt between domestic and foreign bonds is irrelevant in a competitive
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Let (ψ,χ,ϕ,{AG,t+1}∞
t=0,{xt}∞
t=0) be a competitive equilibrium.
If the sequence {A 
G,t+1}∞
t=0 is bounded, then there exists a portfolio ϕ  such that
(ψ,χ,ϕ ,{A 
G,t+1}∞
t=0,{xt}∞
t=0) is a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. We start by constructing the sequence ϕ .F o re a c ht,s e tM 
t+1 = Mt+1
and A 
H,t+1 = AH,t+1 + AG,t+1 − A 
G,t+1. Recall that the initial assets are still
equal to ( ¯ M, ¯ B, ¯ AH, ¯ AG). This allows us to construct {B 
t+1}∞
t=0 in a recursive
fashion. Given B 
t,d e ﬁ n eB 
t+1 so that (5) holds with equality.
We will now show that (ψ,χ,ϕ ,{A 
G,t+1}∞
t=0,{xt}∞
t=0) is a competitive equi-
librium. The ﬁrst step in this process consists of showing that ϕ  satisﬁes the
borrowing bounds in (3). The sequence {A 
G,t+1}∞
t=0 respects that constraint
by assumption. The boundedness of {A 
H,t+1}∞
t=0 follows from the inequality
|A 
H,t+1|≤| AH,t+1| + |AG,t+1| + |A 
G,t+1|.
It takes a little longer to prove that {B 
t+1/St+1}∞
t=0 is bounded. Recall that
B 
0 + S0A 
H,0 = ¯ B + S0 ¯ AH = B0 + S0AH,0. Moreover, both ϕ and ϕ  satisfy
(5) with equality. Then, q0B 
1 + S0q∗
0A 
H,1 = q0B1 + S0q∗
0AH,1. Combine this
equality with (8) to conclude that B 
1 + S1A 
H,1 = B1 + S1AH,1.N o w ,a s s u m e
that
B 
t+1 + St+1A 
H,t+1 = Bt+1 + St+1AH,t+1 (9)
holds for a generic date t. As before, we use (5) and (8) to obtain (9) for-
warded by one period. Thus, induction establishes that (9) holds for for all t.
Hence, |B 
t+1/St+1|≤| Bt+1/St+1|+|AH,t+1|+|A 
H,t+1| and {B 
t+1/St+1}∞
t=0 is
bounded.
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We are now able to conclude the proof. Concerning item (i) of deﬁnition 1,
the pair (χ,ϕ ) yields the same lifetime utility as (χ,ϕ). So, the former is an
optimal choice for the household when the prevailing price system is ψ. Clearly,
ψ satisﬁes (ii). With respect to item (iii), χ and {xt}∞
t=0 obviously satisfy (1).
Moreover, we constructed ϕ  so that A 
H,t+1+A 
G,t+1 = AH,t+1+AG,t+1.T h u s ,
{xt}∞
t=0 and ϕ  satisfy (7). We combine that condition with (1) and (5) with
equality to conclude that (2) holds. 
We now turn to the task of providing some intuition to the above result.
A possible way to interpret Proposition 2 consists of seeing it as equivalent
to the Modigliani-Miller theorem of corporate ﬁnance. In a perfectly competi-
tive environment with full information, whether a ﬁrm ﬁnances its investment
projects with equity or debt is irrelevant. In a similar fashion, it does not matter
whether the government ﬁnances its temporary deﬁcits by issuing domestic or
foreign bonds.
There is a second way to view Proposition 2. Lucas and Stokey [22] stud-
ied optimal ﬁscal policies in a one-sector closed economy. They allowed the
government to issue debt of all maturities. They showed that any competitive
equilibrium pins down only the present value of the public debt, but not its
composition. Chari and Kehoe [11] reached the same conclusion. Proposition
2 shows that only the total value of the public debt matters. Its composition
between domestic and foreign bonds is irrelevant.
Arbitrage opportunities are ruled out in a competitive equilibrium. This
fact provides an alternative interpretation to Proposition 2. (8) ensures that
people are indiﬀerent between domestic and foreign bonds. This allows the gov-
ernment to change the composition of its debt Bt −StAGt without aﬀecting its
value. For instance, the government can sell abroad ∆ units of foreign currency
denominated bonds. Simultaneously, people sell to the government Stq∗
t∆/qt
units of domestic debt and use the proceedings to buy exactly ∆ units of for-
eign bonds. This type of ﬁnancial operation does not change the wealth of
either the government or people or the external sector. Therefore, the composi-
tion of government debt is undetermined and many sequences {AG,t+1}∞
t=0 can
decentralize competitive equilibrium prices and allocations.
We want to emphasize that our results have a nature distinct from that of
Kareken and Wallace [17]. These authors showed that in a two-country model,
if the two national currencies are perfect substitutes, then the exchange rate
path is undetermined. Clearly, the indeterminacy we found in Proposition 2 is
of a diﬀerent type.
Proposition 2 is a consequence of the absence of arbitrage opportunities in
a competitive equilibrium. Therefore, similar results can arise in many distinct
models. This ﬁnding would survive even if we assumed less-than-perfect capital
mobility or that people and the government faced diﬀerent interest rates in the
international market. For the case of stochastic economies, we could also obtain
a similar result, provided that there is a suﬃciently rich set of contingent assets.
Usually the exchange rate is said to ﬂoat if the government does not intervene
in the foreign exchange market. That is, the government carries a constant
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amount of foreign assets. The next deﬁnition follows this tradition.
Deﬁnition 3 The exchange rate ﬂoats at date t in a competitive equilibrium if
AGt+1 = AGt.
As Krugman [18] pointed out, if the government will intervene in the foreign
exchange market sometime in the future, that prospective intervention may
aﬀect the price of the exchange rate today. Hence, it may be convenient to
distinguish permanent from temporary ﬂoating.
Deﬁnition 4 The exchange rate permanently ﬂoats in a competitive equilib-
rium if AGt+1 = ¯ AG for all t.
The last deﬁnition requires the government never to intervene in the foreign
exchange market. This requirement is clearly stronger than the one stated in
Deﬁnition 3.
We are now in a position to apply Proposition 2 to establish a result con-
cerning ﬂoating exchange-rate regimes.
Corollary 5 Let (ψ,χ,ϕ,{AG,t+1}∞
t=0,{xt}∞
t=0) be a competitive equilibrium.
Then, there exist sequences {A 
G,t+1}∞
t=0, ϕ , {A  
G,t+1}∞
t=0 and ϕ   that satisfy:
(1) (ψ,χ,ϕ ,{A 
G,t+1}∞
t=0,{xt}∞
t=0) is a competitive equilibrium in which the ex-
change rate permanently ﬂoats, and (2) (ψ,χ,ϕ  ,{A  
G,t+1}∞
t=0,{xt}∞
t=0) is a
competitive equilibrium in which the exchange rate does not ﬂoat at any date
t.
Proof. We start with the ﬁrst statement. Deﬁne A 
G,t+1 = ¯ AG. Apply Propo-
sition 2 to conclude that (ψ,χ,ϕ ,{A 
G,t+1}∞
t=0,{xt}∞
t=0) is a competitive equi-
librium for some ϕ . Trivially, the exchange rate permanently ﬂoats in that
competitive equilibrium. For the second statement, let δ be any real number.
Then, set A  
G,t+1 = ¯ AG +(−1)t+1δ and use the previous reasoning to ﬁnish the
proof. 
As we have already discussed, the key point underlying Proposition 2 and
Corollary 5 is the fact that in a competitive equilibrium the composition of
the government debt is irrelevant. However, as Lucas and Stokey [22], Chari
and Kehoe [11], Alvarez, Kehoe and Neumeyer [2] and Persson, Persson and
Svensson [26] pointed out, the same is not true when it comes to the time
consistency of macroeconomic policies. We will further explore this point in the
next section.
4O p t i m a l p o l i c i e s
In the previous section we established that the path of foreign assets and external
debt are not uniquely determined in a competitive equilibrium. Two features of
the competitive environment are crucial for this result. First, the government
is not an active player in a Walrasian setting. This prevents this agent from
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reacting to people’s portfolio selection. Second, as Bassetto [4] pointed out, the
competitive equilibrium concept is mute when it comes to out-of-equilibrium
actions.
So that we can consider out-of-equilibrium actions and assess the impact of
household actions on the government decisions, we consider a game built on
the structure we considered in Section 3. This game will be similar to the ones
without commitment in Chari and Kehoe [10] and [11]. Just as those authors
did, we assume that the government cannot commit to a sequence of policies.
Instead, policies are selected on a period-by-period basis.3
We now start describing the game we consider. Given the purposes of this
paper, the behavior of the ﬁscal variables is not relevant. Therefore, we will
retain the assumption that {gt}∞
t=0 and {τt}∞
t=0 are exogenous.
Following Bassetto [4], we require the government to have a balanced bud-
get at all possible nodes of the game. However, as Bassetto [5] showed, it is
impossible to meet this requirement if government expenditures are exogenous.
We take this problem into consideration while setting the game up.
At the beginning of every period t, before markets open, the government
chooses a policy. Then markets open and private agents and government trade.
Note that markets work as described in Section 3. That is, markets for goods
and labor services operate and close before securities and currency markets open.
A monopolistic ﬁrm cannot select a combination of price and quantity out-
side of the demand curve. Similarly, the government cannot freely select ex-
change rate, interest rate, foreign assets, public debt and nominal balances. We
assume that the government selects St, qt and wt.4 Accordingly, we call the
vector ψt =( St,w t,q t) of a date t policy.
At each date t, the government is the ﬁrst player to act. Given the vector
(ϕt,A G,t), the government selects a date t policy ψt and a contingency plan
for future choices. Denote this former choice by σt(ϕt,A G,t).A si nC h a r ia n d
Kehoe [10] and [11], we say that the sequence σ = {σt}∞
t=0 is policy plan and
the sequence σt = {σk}∞
k=t is the continuation of σ from date t onwards. The
government is benevolent. Hence, its payoﬀ is
∞ 
k=t
β
k−tu(c1k,c 2k,1 − lk) .( 1 0 )
So far we have not required the government’s actions to respect either the
feasibility (1) or the balance of payment (7). However, one of them must con-
strain the government’s choices. Otherwise, the government could simply pick
a policy that would induce households to consume an inﬁnite amount. Recall
that with (5) holding with equality, (2), (1) and (7) are linearly dependent. So,
3We do not consider in this paper the case in which the government can commit to a
policy. We do so because it is a straightforward exercise to show that results equivalent to
Proposition 2 and Corollary 5 hold in such a context.
4By selecting which variables the government can choose, we are deﬁning a strategy set for
that player and consequently selecting a particular game to study. The resulting outcomes
are not invariant to such a choice. However, for the purposes of this paper it is enough to
consider a game in which the neutrality results obtained in Section 3 do not hold.
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without loss of generality we assume that (1) constrains the government’s ac-
t i o n sa n dl e tt h i sa g e n ts e l e c txt. We denote by ηt(ϕt,A G,t,ψt) the government
trade-balance strategy as a function of (ϕt,A G,t,ψt),b yη the sequence {ηt}∞
t=0
and by ηt its continuation.
The next agents to act are the households. When a typical household takes
its date t decisions, it already knows both (ϕt,A G,t) and ψt.G i v e n (ϕt,A G,t,ψ t),
a household chooses χt and ϕt+1 and contingency plans for future dates. We
denote the date t decisions (χt,ϕ t+1) by ξt(ϕt,A G,t,ψ t). The sequence {ξt}∞
t=0
is denoted by ξ and it is called a decision plan.T h econtinuation ξ
t of ξ is the
sequence {ξk}∞
k=t. A typical household payoﬀ is given by (10).
The ﬁrm acts as in the previous section. Namely, it observes ψt and then
chooses lt to maximize its date t proﬁt.
After learning of households’ and the ﬁrm’s actions, the government will
select AG,t+1. Since this agent is required to balance its budget under all con-
tingencies, the only possible choice for this variable is the one consistent with
(2).5
As we have previously mentioned, Bassetto [5] pointed out that for some
conceivable household actions, the government may fail to meet its budget con-
straint. To deal with this problem, we provide the government with a shutdown
option. At each date t, while the securities and currency markets are open, the
government can default on all of its debt and change the ﬁscal variables g and
τ so that they both will equal zero at t and afterwards. No government bond
will ever be issued again and the economy will operate with a constant stock
of money thereafter. If the government is ever shut down, its payoﬀ will be
u(0,0,0) at t and all future dates. Clearly, the government will always prefer
not to exercise this option. A shutdown will take place only if the government
fails to balance its budget without resorting to it.
Before proceeding with the game description, it is convenient to emphasize
two points. First, by introducing the shutdown option we allowed the govern-
ment policy to be contingent on households’ actions, as Bassetto [5] suggested.
Second, as that author pointed out, allowing the policies to depend on people’s
actions enlarges the set of equilibrium outcomes. For the particular game we are
considering, it is possible to have an equilibrium with a government shutdown.
However, we are not interested in this type of equilibrium and we will solely
focus on equilibria without this feature. Therefore, from now on we simply
disregard the shutdown option.
At this point it is possible to verify how the vector (ϕt,A G,t) evolves. The
law-of-motion for households’ asset holdings is simply
ϕt+1 = ξϕ,t(ϕt,A G,t,σ t(ϕt,A G,t)) ,( 1 1 )
where ξϕ,t denotes the coordinates of ξt that are associated with the asset hold-
ings (Mt+1,B t+1,A H,t+1). The government’s foreign assets are then obtained
from its budget constraint (2).
5Observe that out of equilibrium, a household and ﬁrm’s choice of lt may diﬀer. So, we
assume that the tax on labor income is always evaluated taking the household choice as the
basis. Hence, AG,t+1 is well deﬁned.
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Consider the situation of a household at date t.G i v e nϕt, AG,t, ψt and a pol-
icy plan σt, a household chooses {c1k,c 2k,l k}∞
k=t and {Mk+1,B k+1,A H,k+1}∞
k=t
to maximize (10) subject to (5) and (6). A household takes into consideration
that the future policies are induced by σt.
Consider now the government situation at date t.G i v e nϕt, AG,t and a deci-
sion plan ξ
t, the government has to choose a policy plan σt and a trade-balance
rule ηt to maximize (10) subject to (1) and (2). The government considers that
the sequence of future allocations is given by the best responses ξ
t to futures
policies, which in turn are induced by σt.
Deﬁnition 6 A Markov sustainable equilibrium is an array (σ,η,ξ) satisfying:
(i) given the policy plan σ, ξ
t provides solutions for both households’ and ﬁrms’
problems at every period t and all vectors (ϕt,A G,t); (ii) given the decision
plan ξ, σt and ηt solve the government’s problem at every period t and all
vectors (ϕt,A G,t). An array (ψ
m,χ m,ϕ m,{Am
G,t+1}∞
t=0,{xm
t }∞
t=0) is a Markov
sustainable outcome if there exists a Markov sustainable equilibrium (σ,η,ξ)
such that σt(ϕm
t ,A m
G,t)=ψ
m
t , ηt(ϕm
t ,A m
G,t,ψ
m
t )=xm
t and ξt(ϕm
t ,A m
G,t,ψ
m
t )=
(χm
t ,ϕ m
t+1).
It is worth emphasizing three points in the above deﬁnition. First, the
Markov sustainable equilibrium builds on the sustainable equilibrium introduced
in Chari and Kehoe [10]. Second, this equilibrium concept requires optimal
behavior even for out-of-equilibrium assets (ϕt,A G,t) and policies ψt.T h i r d ,a
Markov sustainable outcome is attainable (i.e., it is a competitive equilibrium).
We now turn to the task of characterizing the best Markov sustainable out-
comes.6 We ﬁrst characterize the attainable set. To simplify the notation, u(t),
u1(t), u2(t),a n du3(t) denote, respectively, the value of u and its partial deriv-
atives evaluated at the point (c1t,c 2t,l t).T h es u mu1(t)c1t + u2(t)c2t − u3(t)lt
is denoted by W(t).
We use techniques similar to those of Lucas and Stokey [22] and Chari and
Kehoe [12] to characterize the competitive equilibrium set in terms of a few
equalities and inequalities. The ﬁrst condition is the feasibility condition (1).
The second one is
∞ 
k=t
β
k−tW(k)=u1(t)c1t + u2(t)

AH,t +
Bt + Mt
St
− c1t

,( 1 2 )
which consolidates households’ period budget constraints from date t onwards.
The third condition is a balance-of-payment constraint
−
∞ 
k=t
Q∗
s
Q∗
t
xk = AH,t + AG,t .( 1 3 )
A fourth requirement, ensuring that people’s intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution is consistent with q∗
t,i s
6In the type of game we are considering the equilibrium set can be large. We focus on a
best (i.e, one that yields the higher date zero utility) outcome.
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q∗
t = β
u2(t +1 )
u2(t)
.( 1 4 )
A ﬁfth condition,
(1 − τt)=
u3(t)
u2(t)
,( 1 5 )
is an implementability constraint for labor income taxation. The inequality
Stc1t ≤ Mt (16)
ensures that the cash-in-advance constraints hold, while
u2(t) ≤ u1(t) (17)
ensures qt ≤ 1. Conditions (1) and (12)-(17) characterize the set of attainable
sequences.
We now start characterizing a best Markov sustainable outcome. In the
discussion that follows, we assume that the set of sequences that satisﬁes (1)
and (12)-(17) is not empty. That is, there is at least one conceivable competitive
equilibrium.
Consider the following family of problems: at each date t, choose {ψk}∞
k=t,
{χk}∞
k=t, {ϕk+1}∞
k=t, {AG,k+1}∞
k=t, and {xk}∞
k=t to solve
Vt(ϕt,A G,t)=m a x
∞ 
k=t
β
k−tu(c1k,c 2k,l k) (18)
subject to (1), (12)-(17), and
∞ 
k=T
β
k−Tu(c1k,c 2k,l k) ≥ VT(ϕT,A G,T) , T ≥ t +1 .( 1 9 )
Arguments similar to those in Chari and Kehoe [11] establish that from the
solution of the above problems it is possible to construct plans σ, η and ξ that
constitute a Markov sustainable equilibrium. By construction, this equilibrium
yields the highest date zero utility in the sustainable set. We summarize this
discussion in the next proposition.
Proposition 7 The solution of problem (18) for t =0constitutes a best Markov
sustainable outcome.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We are now in a position to establish that a best Markov sustainable alloca-
tion and policy cannot be decentralized by many sequences ϕ and {AG,t+1}∞
t=0.
In other words, the counterparts of Proposition 2 and Corollary 5 are generally
not true in the particular game we are considering. We carry out this task by
m e a n so fa ne x a m p l e .
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Example 8 Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer [2] showed that time consistent
outcomes are Markov sustainable. We use this fact repeatedly in this example.
Assume that u(c1t,c 2t,1 − lt)=l o gc1t +l o gc2t +l o g ( 1− lt), ¯ M>0, ¯ B =
¯ AH = ¯ AG =0 , q∗
t = β, gt = g>0 and τt =0for all t. Since the government
has a permanent deﬁcit, it will be willing to use all available lump-sum revenue
at date zero. Hence, a Ramsey outcome (i.e., a best competitive equilibrium)
will surely require that (6) hold as equality at date zero. So, we can write the
date zero constraint (12) as
∞ 
t=0
β
t

2 −
lt
1 − lt

=1. (20)
Consider now the problem of maximizing (4) subject to (20), c1t+c2t+g+xt = lt,  ∞
t=0β
txt =0 , c2t = c2t+1 and c2t =1− lt Note that the last four constraints
correspond to (1), (13), (14) and (15). A little work shows that the solution of
this problem speciﬁes constant values for c1t, c2t, lt and xt. Moreover, the need
to satisfy the government budget constraint will ensure that there is a positive
inﬂation rate and consequently (17) holds.
Let ψ
r, χr and {xr
t}∞
t=0 denote the Ramsey policy and allocation. From
Proposition 2 and Corollary 5 there are many cash and asset sequences that can
implement (ψ
r,χ r,{xr
t}∞
t=0) as a competitive equilibrium. However, as Lucas
and Stokey [22], Alvarez, Kehoe and Neumeyer [2] and Persson, Persson and
Svensson [26] showed, there is usually one debt structure that will make the
Ramsey outcome time consistent. We deﬁne Ar
G,t+1 = Ar
H,t+1 = Br
t+1 =0and
Mr
t+1 = Sr
t+1cr
1t. With these assets, if the Ramsey problem is solved again at
some date T>0, this new problem will have exactly the same constraints as
the date zero problem. Hence, the continuation of the date zero solution will
also solve the date T Ramsey problem.
The Ramsey outcome is attainable. The fact that it is time consistent ensures
that
∞
k=T β
k−Tu(cr
1k,c r
2k,l r
k) ≥ VT(ϕr
T,A r
G,T) for all T. Thus, the Ramsey
outcome is also Markov sustainable. In this outcome, Ar
G,t+1 =0= ¯ AG. Hence,
in this particular example, the Markov sustainability of the best attainable
allocation calls for a permanently ﬂoating regime.
Suppose now that at some date T − 1 > 0, households and government
deviate from the assets ϕr
T to an alternative array ϕ 
T. More speciﬁcally, M 
T
is equal to Mr
T,b u tB 
T satisﬁes B 
T + M 
T < 0. Of course, to balance the
households’ budgets and the country’s external account, it is necessary that
A 
H,T > 0 and A 
G,T < 0.A f t e rd a t eT −1, people and government revert to the
Ramsey cash and bond holdings. Denote these alternative sequences by ϕ  and
{A 
G,t+1}∞
t=0.
Had a statement equivalent to Proposition 2 been true for Markov sustain-
able outcomes, (ψ
r,χ r,ϕ  ,{A 
G,t+1}∞
t=0,{xr
t}∞
t=0) would be a best Markov sus-
tainable outcome. However, this is not the case. Consider the situation of
the government at date T. Observe that B 
T + M 
T < 0 and households are
in debt to the government. Therefore, the government can pick an exchange
rate S  
T that is low enough to make the real value of the debt suﬃciently
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large to cover its future consumption expenditures and any future interest it
owes abroad (recall that A 
G,T < 0). We can go even further and conclude
the government can implement the Friedman rule qt =1 .S i n c e τt =0for
all t, the government will be able to implement a Pareto eﬃcient allocation
as a competitive equilibrium. Denote that allocation by {χ  
t ,x   
t }∞
t=T and the
underlying policy by {ψ
  
t }∞
t=T. Clearly, if future assets are selected to satisfy
(B  
t + M  
t )/S  
t =( B 
T + M 
T)/S  
T,w ee n s u r et h a t{χ  
t ,x   
t }∞
t=T is time con-
sistent. Therefore, (ψ
r,χ r,ϕ  ,{A 
G,t+1}∞
t=0,{xr
t}∞
t=0) cannot be a best Markov
sustainable outcome.
5 Conclusion
Economists have long argued about the advantages and disadvantages of ﬂoating
exchange rate regimes. In this paper we showed that this type of regime is
consistent with any competitive equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is simple. Arbitrage opportunities are absent in
a competitive equilibrium. Thus, it is always possible to change the composi-
tion of people’s portfolios between foreign and government issued bonds. As a
consequence of this indeterminacy of people’s portfolios, the composition of the
government’s debt between domestic and foreign claims is also undetermined.
Hence, any path for the foreign assets or debt is possible at the competitive
equilibrium prices. One can easily relate this result to the Modigliani-Miller
Theorem.
It is well known that the composition and maturity of government debt
matter for the time consistency of monetary policy. We used this fact to establish
that in a game in which the government selects policies in a sequential fashion,
the outcomes are not invariant to the path of the foreign assets. Therefore, the
study of the implications of adopting a speciﬁc exchange rate regime should rely
on more sophisticated equilibrium concepts than the competitive one.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 7. Let (ψ
m,χ m,ϕ m,{Am
G,t+1}∞
t=0,{xm
t }∞
t=0) be a solu-
tion for (18). We need to show that there exists a Markov sustainable equi-
librium (σ,η,ξ) that satisﬁes σt(ϕm
t ,A m
G,t)=ψ
m
t , ηt(ϕm
t ,A m
G,t,ψ
m
t )=xm
t and
ξt(ϕm
t ,A m
G,t,ψ
m
t )=( χm
t ,ϕ m
t+1).
We carry out the proof in four steps: (1) construct the plans σ, η and ξ;
(2) show that these plans constitute a Markov sustainable equilibrium; (3) show
that (σ,η,ξ) induces (ψ
m,χ m,ϕ m,{Am
G,t+1}∞
t=0,{xm
t }∞
t=0) and (4) show that
(σ,η,ξ) induces the highest attainable date zero utility.
Step 1: For each t,s e tσt(ϕt,A G,t) as the ψt solution of problem (18). To
construct ξ we use another maximization problem. Select {ψk}∞
k=t+1, {χk}∞
k=t,
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{ϕk+1}∞
k=t, and {xk}∞
k=t to solve
VH,t(ϕt,A G,t,ψ t)=m a x
∞ 
k=t
β
k−tu(c1k,c 2k,l k) (21)
subject to date t (5) and (6); dates k ≥ t +1(1), (12)-(17), and (19). The
above problem does not impose the date t government budget constraint (2),
(1) and other competitive equilibrium conditions. We proceed in this way be-
cause, as Chari and Kehoe [11] pointed out, the function ξ must specify the
behavior of the consumer even for out-of-equilibrium policies. Additionally, we
construct problem (21) in such a way that people consider that the govern-
ment will pick policies according to the solution of problem (18) for all dates
s ≥ t +1 .W ed e ﬁ n eξt(ϕt,A G,t,ψ t) as a (χt,ϕ t+1) solution to (21). We then
deﬁne ηt(ϕt,A G,t,ψ t) to satisfy (1).
Step 2: To show that ξt is an optimal choice for households, observe that con-
straint (19) ensures that people take into consideration that future policies are
given by the solution of problem (18) while solving (21). Thus, given {σk}∞
k=t+1,
ξt is an optimal choice for households. To show that given {ξk}∞
k=t σt is an op-
timal choice for the government, consider the problem
VG,t(ϕt,A G,t)=m a x
ψt
VH,t(ϕt,A G,t,ψt)
subject to date t (1), (2), (14), (15), and (17). Its solution is the best the
government can do, given the decision rule ξ
t. But the constraints of the above
problem are exactly those of problem (18) and consequently Vt(ϕt,A G,t)=
VG,t(ϕt,A G,t).T h u s ,σF
t is an optimal choice for the government.
Step 3: We now apply induction. Since (ψ
m,χ m,ϕ m,{Am
G,t+1}∞
t=0,{xm
t }∞
t=0)
solves (18) for t =0 , it follows that σ0(¯ ϕ, ¯ AG)=ψ
m
0 , ξ0(¯ ϕ, ¯ AG,ψ
m
0 )=( χm
0 ,ϕ m
1 )
and η0(¯ ϕ, ¯ AG,ψ
m
0 )=xm
0 .A s s u m et h a tσt(ϕm
t ,A m
G,t)=ψ
m
t , ξt(ϕm
t ,A m
G,t,ψ
m
t )=
(χm
t ,ϕ m
t+1) and ηt(ϕm
t ,A m
G,t,ψ
m
t )=xm
t . At date t +1 , given assets ϕm
t+1,c o n -
straint (19) ensures that the solution of problem (18) will specify the policy
ψ
m
t+1.G i v e n(ϕm
t+1,ψ
m
t+1), the argument of Step 2 shows that
VH(ϕm
t+1,A m
G,t+1,ψ
m
t+1)=Vt+1(ϕm
t+1,A m
G,t+1)=
∞ 
k=t+1
β
s−(t+1)u(cm
1k,c m
2k,l m
k ) .
Thus, (χm
t+1,ϕ m
t+2) constitutes an optimal choice for a typical household. Triv-
ially, ηt+1(ϕm
t+1,A m
G,t+1,ψ
m
t+1)=xm
t+1.
Step 4: Any competitive equilibrium (ψ,χ,ϕ,{AG,t+1}∞
t=0,{xt}∞
t=0) that yields
a higher date zero utility than (ψ
m,χ m,ϕ m,{Am
G,t+1}∞
t=0,{xm
t }∞
t=0) must violate
some constraint of the family (19). Therefore, such a competitive equilibrium
cannot be a Markov sustainable outcome. 
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